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Introduction 
 
High risk banking practices were a central factor of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the world is still feeling 
the aftershocks. Sovereign debt, austerity, and the degradation of social benefits, employee rights, and even the 
democratic framework of sovereign nations have been only some of the negative results.  Given the complicated 
nature of modern financial markets, complex and remote financial instruments, and the banking industry, it is 
uncertain as to whether the current banking regulation and reforms can provide an effective safety net to avoid 
the social costs associated with future financial crises. It could be that it is time for a paradigm shift in the way in 
which banking and lending are approached from a philosophical perspective, taking into account a renewed 
understanding of the purpose and character of debt and lending, particularly when dealing with those debt 
transactions affecting individuals. Considering the juxtaposition of wealth maximisation, a fundamental aim of 
banking and finance, to the potential social costs when profit focussed activities go wrong, it could be possible 
that a neo-liberal and economically focussed approach to banking regulation and reform may need to be shifted 
to reflect the actual social costs of capitalism.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fundamental underpinnings of the UK’s approach to banking and 
lending with a focus on the apparent theoretical or philosophical approach to banking and regulation within the 
economy with reference to Coase’s “The Problem of Social Costs”1 and whether or not his framework of analysis 
is relevant to the regulation of today’s financial markets.  The origins of the financial crisis in irresponsible 
banking and lending practices will be explored as well as the social costs the financial crisis and the specific 
impact of lending practices on the consumer. Historic views on debt will be presented with a view to tracing how 
those views have changed in the modern age, particularly in consideration of the banking industry’s approach to 
debt selling. There will also be brief look at some of the post crisis regulatory reforms that have occurred and a 
critical analysis of the neo-liberal economic approach in this area, followed by a conclusion that will comment on 
whether or not the current approach and underpinning theoretical framework can be adequate to circumvent the 
social costs of irresponsible banking practices in the future. 
 
 
Origins of Financial Crisis 
 
It is fairly well known that the most recent global recession was triggered by a subprime mortgage crisis in the 
United States in 2007, which then led to a global liquidity crisis due to the interconnectedness of many financial 
institutions, both banks and non-banks, which were affected by the “credit crunch.”2 It was common to transfer 
certain repackaged debt obligations to increase liquidity, thereby giving creditors a means of trading debt 
obligations on the market. Without debt instruments to facilitate trading, debt remains an obligation from one 
party to another. When debt instruments are used as a means of facilitating debt trading, debt obligations can be 
removed from one party and given to another quickly and efficiently. Complex debt relationships have evolved 
among the financial institutions of the world, thus when mistakes are made by one, whether through negligence 
or mismanagement or simply overly risky behaviour, all institutions are affected, or perhaps infected as a result.3 
Thus when banks ceased to function in the provision of credit on the scale to which the world economy had 
become accustomed, states often intervened in order to protect the national economies from complete collapse.4  
 
Once confidence was shaken in Lehman Brothers in 2008, fewer market participants were willing to purchase 
securities from them as the trust that the company would eventually be able to repurchase them at a higher price 
                                                          
1 R. H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Costs” (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
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had been lost.5 Its collapse and bankruptcy led to great market uncertainty and, failing to secure a government 
rescue package, revealed a fundamental cause of the crisis: excessive risk-taking. The loss of confidence in the 
financial system caused by the collapse of Lehman led to a global market collapse, which frightened many 
governments into action to try to avoid additional bank collapses by providing bail outs to many banking 
institutions. It impacted not just banks, but a number of financial type institutions, such as the insurance group 
AIG, which had linked itself to complex mortgage backed securities market, providing guarantees for 
collateralised debt obligations without making adequate provision in capital for any claims that could arise.6  The 
complex financial instruments to which the risks were attached lured considerable interest due to promised high 
returns, leading to additional repackaging and securitising and rapid growth in this market due to the perceived 
efficiency and high returns on investment. Eventually the demand for these kinds of products overwhelmed the 
need for due diligence regarding their product quality, which fuelled demand for the securitisation of lower forms 
of assets, such as subprime mortgages.7  
 
While massive bank collapses were viewed as an imminent threat to the global economy, there remained a 
question of moral hazard as to whether it could be justified for governments to intervene with taxpayer’s money 
to rescue banks from collapse when essentially the primary cause of their distress was mismanagement.8  
Essentially, governments would be taking money from the people they were trying to protect from the effects of 
banking collapses caused by mismanagement of the very debt that belonged to the people governments were trying 
to protect! Of course, the banking industry also has an intimate connection to the lives of ordinary people as it is 
to the banks that people turn in order to acquire loans for housing, entrepreneurial business activities, and pensions 
to see them through to the end of their days. Thus when the banking industry suffers, regardless if the taxpayer is 
forced to bail them out, the ordinary man will also suffer due to difficulties in attaining credit.  
 
The financial crisis exposed existing problems in the financial markets and the banking industry in terms of 
financial supervision, theory and practice. In addition, the intangible nature of debt securities and credit derivatives 
calls into question the value that can be placed on a promise when it has passed through numerous “hands” and 
has been split, combined, and amalgamated subject to additional promises that rely on all previous promises being 
met, until the original “promise” is no longer recognisable. This sounds more like fantasy than any real transaction 
between financial entities and/or individuals.   
 
 
Modern Views on Debt9 
 
Debt used to have an intrinsic moral dimension tied to the human condition. While early banks could only lend 
against the deposits held within the bank, this is no longer banking norm. Today dispensing with debt has become 
a financial decision as institutions tend to treat individual debt obligations as profit-making and capital freeing 
instruments. Granted, in order for banks to lend to individuals, they must first have capital to provide to borrowers 
and capital can only be freed if banks can also free themselves from the debt of their borrowers, often by selling 
it on through the complex securitization transactions, such as those that were at least partially indicted by 
assessments of the financial crisis. However, the extent to which debts can now be separated from the individual 
who owes them is reflective of fundamental changes in how debt is perceived in the modern financial context, 
particularly when compared to the anthropological origins of debt as a concept.  
 
Debt and credit have an extraordinarily long history lying well outside their current financial aspects. It has been 
said that the origin of modern debt and credit lies in a sense of human community, mutual obligations, and 
morality.10 It has been viewed as a product of humanity’s existential condition owed by virtue of the natural mutual 
protections afforded by living in a society or, from a religious standpoint, the existential debt owed to a supreme 
being.11 Those living proper and moral lives are obliged to constantly repay the existential debts owed to one 
another. This evolved into a social obligation over time related to  a reputation for honesty and charity,12 something 
that can be traced to the early developments of social contract theory as well.  
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Ingham, The Nature of Money (2004, Polity Press, Maldon MA), at 90. 
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25(3) The International History Review 505-562, at 506. 
 In principle, debt requires a relationship between individuals who do not consider each other fundamentally 
different and who are potentially equals. The balance of debt and credit addresses this equality in the sense that 
the urge to repay a debt is also the need to reinstate the equality between the debtor and creditor. If one is then 
unable to reinstate that equality, the person who is in debt must be at fault. Thus a debt is an exchange between 
individuals that has not yet been reciprocated.13 Given the association of creditworthiness with reputation for 
honesty and integrity, financial debt obligations eventually became indistinguishable from moral obligations.14 
Hence the development of laws prohibiting usurious lending which was viewed as a type of theft as the charging 
of interest had no representation in goods. As money was meant to be only to be a representation of value in goods 
and services, interest was equated to taking money from an individual for nothing in return.15  
 
The growth of capitalism precipitated the gradual collapse of economic reliance upon traditional communities due 
to the growing power of an impersonal market. There was a gradual transformation of moral networks by the 
intrusion of impersonal market rules and the powers of the state. The legalisation of interest led to the evolution 
of signed legal bonds agreeing terms of loans, which in turn required the evolution of a court system that could 
deal with the influx of commercial claims.16 While today debts and credits have taken on an impersonal and purely 
financial character within a specific legal framework, their derivation is in good faith, socially acceptable 
behaviour and reputation that create the “credit” of an individual in society.17  
 
Whether or not the origins of debt can truly be said to be in this ideal of human community and the obligations 
owed to one another for the safety of living in society, it can certainly be agreed that debt was once a personal 
obligation that most individuals would seek to escape as soon as possible. This could be due to the feeling of being 
subordinated to another human being due to what is owed, or perhaps just the consequences of not repaying. 
Today, however, it is rare to find an individual who does not live in a perpetual state of financial debt: it is the 
accepted status quo of the human condition, which has essentially commoditised the value of debt into something 
that has been separated from its moral roots. It has become abstracted from any proprietary interest that a debtor 
may have had over it; banks do not ask a mortgagor if they can sell their “IOU” on to hedge funds, insurance 
companies, or other financial institutions, despite that by all appearances, debt has a proprietary nature. While it 
could be that banks are exchanging funding now for money later as the debt is repaid, the question remains as to 
how if debt is an obligation, how can it be sold free from consent?  It is admitted that this is a highly controversial 
assertion, given that these transactions have been going on for centuries, essentially in a sense like a bookmaker 
laying off large bets to other book makers in order to reduce their exposure. Applying the analogy, these 
transactions can effectively spread the risk across the financial market rather than   
 
 
Social Costs of Financial Crisis 
 
The banking origins of the financial crisis fed into the sovereign debt problems in Europe, which led to a severe 
economic slowdown and eventually a crisis of the Euro in 2010. This crisis was due in part to differentials in 
macroeconomic development between the member states in the Euro, with the previously more expensive and 
developed countries becoming balanced with those states that used to benefit from their less expensive production 
environment. Thus the economic advantages of states like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy that could benefit 
from the imbalance in competitiveness prior to the introduction of the Euro, lost their edge. This combined with 
mounting current account deficits, led to the sovereign debt crisis.18 The situation in Europe in 2010 has been 
described as a twin sovereign and banking crisis that mutually feed each other, resulting in a gradual contagion to 
more countries and more asset classes. Government bailouts of national banks further added to the public debt 
and as private debt became public debt, sovereign debt became critical.19  
 
Since the financial crisis and following the sovereign debt crisis there have been massive changes in national 
approaches to the regulation of aspects of national and supranational economies and social policies. This is 
particularly evident in the changes that have occurred throughout the EU in its reduced emphasis on social 
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protections, in favour instead of a more neo-liberal approach designed to support its weakened economic status. 
Member State reforms under these revised EU policies as well as the austerity measures required in those States 
that are party to Memoranda of Understanding20 in return for financial support have seen the steady erosion of 
workers’ rights generally, while the “rescue culture”21 has been steadily infused into Member State legal systems. 
While the presence of good rescue mechanisms may mitigate to some extent the loss of social protection, it is 
questionable whether or not such reforms are capable of going far enough to protect the most vulnerable of those 
EU citizens affected by the financial crisis.22  There has thus been a fundamental shift in welfare state politics 
with austerity becoming a key measure to combat growing budget deficits. While a number of economists have 
now discredited the economic research that allegedly supported the push toward austerity, it remains a central 
feature of the recovery efforts that continue to exist, particularly in those countries whose sovereign debt spiralled 
to the point of needing or nearly needing supranationally supported loans to avoid insolvency.23 This in turn has 
created a democratic deficit due to the requirements of these loans to reform the affected countries’ legal systems, 
regardless of whether or not the government has been elected on an austerity platform or otherwise.  
 
Beyond the impact on employment and business failure, the financial and sovereign debt crises have also affected 
individual borrowers seeking to finance business ventures or to purchase family homes. Repossessions became a 
common claim due to the inability to repay mortgages as a result of the fall in housing prices. Social benefits have 
been cut back everywhere as a part of austerity measures. This has often had the most severe effects on the most 
vulnerable individuals in society: the elderly and the disabled. Suicides among those vulnerable members of 
society who have been put through the rigours of defending their need to receive certain benefits have risen due 
to the stress and hopelessness that changes to benefit to which changes in applications have led. While public 
support for the welfare state has not changed, rather indications are that it has become even more beloved due to 
the fact that it shields people from losing their jobs and protects income in case of unemployment, there has been 
a steady erosion of social rights and benefits.24 It has been argued that a number of countries had gone too far in 
their social protections, causing some of their debt related problems by failing to balance social policy with the 
requirements of capital. However, the social impact on individuals due to the instigation of austerity is manifest.  
 
 
A Legal Economic Analysis of Debt Instruments 
 
The financial sector has long benefitted from a neo-liberal economic approach to its regulation. This has allowed 
innovation in investment and profit-making, creating new and different debt instruments and ways of selling and 
packaging them in order to increase bank liquidity, permitting more and greater lending to individuals and 
businesses. However, the roots of the crisis in high risk debt trading have shown that such an approach does not 
afford the social benefit that highly liquid financial markets were meant to provide. Rather, it has required input 
from tax-payers to make sure the economy did not implode entirely. It must be queried, then, if a purely economic 
approach to regulation of the financial market is adequate, particularly given the distance that has evolved between 
debt and the human element of it and the ease of  which it is now disposed.  
 
The principles of Law and Economics provide an analytical framework within which a balance between social 
and commercial interests is sought.  The basis of an economic approach to legal rules assumes that the people 
involved in a legal system will act rationally to maximise their own satisfaction.25 In an economic analysis of the 
law, if two opposing sides of an issue behave rationally, they will find a balance that maximises the 
benefits/happiness of each side when an outcome is uncertain at the outset.26 Rational maximisation within a legal 
system suggests that by putting a conceptual price on legal rights and remedies, it will be possible to create legal 
rules that maximise effectiveness by finding the perfect balance of economic efficiency between competing 
aims.27  
                                                          
20 Hereafter referred to as “MoU”. 
21 An economic policy emphasising the priority of rehabilitating viable companies in financial distress for the purposes of preserving their 
economic value as well as the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an enterprise, including unsecured creditors, employees, 
communities and other stakeholders. 
22 A full exploration of the impacts of the sovereign debt and financial crises on employment protection and corporate rescue was explored 
at the IEAF Conference in Istanbul in 2014 in a paper entitled, “The Road to Recovery: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of the 
Financial Crisis on the Rights of Workers in Greece, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom and their Insolvency Legal Systems” written 
with Dr Alexandra Kastrinou.  
23 For an exploration of the economic arguments against austerity, see P. Krugman, “The Austerity Delusion” (2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion> accessed 30 April 2015. 
24 B. Vis, K. Van Kersbergen and T. Hylands, “To What Extent Did the Financial Crisis Intensify the Pressure to Reform the Welfare 
State?” (2011) 45(4) Social Policy & Administration 338, at 342. 
25 R.A. Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory” (1979) 8(1) JLS 104. 
26 R.A. Posner, “Observation: The Economic Approach to Law” (1974) 53 Tex L Rev 761. 
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 Law and economics defines a good legal system as one that keeps the profitability of businesses and the welfare 
of people aligned, so that the pursuit of profit also benefits the public. This is somewhat reflective of the ideals of 
utilitarianism, a fairly hedonistic and secular political theory that places the overall pleasure or perhaps satisfaction 
of humanity as the defining characteristic of what is “right” for humanity in terms of political and legal structure.28 
However, while classical utilitarianism seeks to maximise the sum of all individuals’ functions in terms of utility, 
law and economics aims to try to maximise social wealth rather than social utility. Goods should be awarded to 
those individuals who are willing to pay the most, not to those for whom those goods will have the highest utility. 
Fines and sanctions then become a deterrent if they are set at a level that people are unwilling the “pay the price” 
for doing the unwanted behaviour. The trick is to set the price at a level that deters the behaviour, but does not 
deter one from engaging in some risk, particularly if applied to economic activity.29 While true that sanctions may 
prevent unwanted and costly behaviour, it would be economically inefficient in terms of regulating the financial 
market to set those sanctions at such a level that no one would want to lend, invest, or follow entrepreneurial 
ideas. Thus a balance needs to be struck in order to find the point that deters enough behaviour to retain some 
order in the market, while not discouraging some risk in the market.  
 
One problem with the law and economics theoretical framework is that it has been perceived as being of a 
specifically free-market, capitalistic ideology and even an apology for conservatism. While it is not intended to 
paint capitalism as “evil”, it must also be acknowledged that it does not often consider those elements of society 
that fall outside of the markets and profit. If economic efficiency depends on what people are willing to pay, then 
by association, a person’s willingness to pay is directly connected to what they are able to afford. Thus the more 
wealth one has, the more likely it is that it can be increased in a system built on models of pure economic 
efficiency. Its precept tends to support unequal income distribution, which tends to be a highly political subject. 
 
Ronald Coase’s theory, developed in the 1960s, on social costs posits that in circumstances where two activities 
conflict, the costs should be assessed as the combination of both activities. The classic example used was a 
scenario where a train travels through a farmer’s field and causes crop fires on occasion due to flying sparks. 
While many would view it as axiomatic that the farmer should be compensated for the losses incurred, Coase’s 
view was that it was not merely the case that without the railway there would have been no fire, but that if the 
farmer had not planted crops so close to the railroad tracks, there would similarly have been no fire. This approach 
has allowed the application elements of supply and demand on how damage may be allocated. The economic 
analysis of law has an underlying capitalistic foundation and the fault-based approach would require far more 
government regulation than a profit driven society could accept.  
 
The train in Coase’s example had a social benefit. It provides transportation of the very crops that the farmers 
grow. It allowed for quicker access between cities and represents a kind of progress that has effectively benefitted 
all. There is an argument to be made for ensuring that the damage caused by trains, were a fault based approach 
applied, might lead to changes and limitations in rail travel that could reduce its overall usefulness to society. As 
such, a balanced approach that allocates the costs to both farmers and railways can allow for both to continue to 
co-exist and provide their benefits to society as a whole.  
 
Fast-forward to the modern day and apply Coase’s theory to the prospect of financial regulation. The railway and 
the farmers’ crops both provide a social benefit that has the potential to enrich all of society in one way or another. 
While the ability to sell debt allows for increased liquidity and releases capital for lending, does the current system 
effectively put capital in the right places so that all of society can benefit from these transactions, rather than those 
who do the buying and selling? Regulation has been created to control industrial pollution, noise and other noxious 
or anti-social effects of industry, but complicated financial transactions and particularly those involving complex, 
repackaged, depersonalised debt instruments present an entirely different social cost that regulators should 
probably take into account. If debt is an obligation or promise, what happens when that promise is mixed with 
other promises, amalgamated, divided, sold and dispersed to the point that it is no longer identifiable? Granted, 
debt is itself only a concept having no true physical existence, at least not since the un-pegging of majory 
currencies from the gold standard, and even then money only represented a promise to pay something else of 
equivalent value, accepted only because it is assumed that others will also accept it as valuable in exchange.30 
That said, if debt is to remain a promise, surely the person who made that promise should remain connected to it 
in some way.  
 
                                                          
28 M. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) Chapters 2 and 3; B. Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory 
and Context (6th edn, 2012, Sweet & Maxwell, London) Chapter 3. 
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30 D. Graeber, above note 10, at 47. 
Conclusion 
 
Following the crisis of 2007/2008 reform in banking and finance was firmly on the agenda of many of the most 
affected countries throughout the world. The United States passed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, which was a compendium of financial regulations affecting financial institutions and 
their customers, passed in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of events that caused the 2008 financial crisis. The 
UK passed the Banking Act in 2009 following the Turner Review which was the regulatory response to the global 
banking crisis, the Banking Reform Act in 2013, and set up the Prudential Regulation Authority that can hold 
banks to account for the way they separate their retail and investment activities. The EU has issued the De 
Larosiere Report, which has provided some foundation for reform, though it does not have binding force, while 
there have also been changes to the institutions dealing with banking by introducing the European Banking 
Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority. Many of these reforms have been fundamentally 
reactive in nature, though they have certainly gone further than any reforms that have come before. That said, it 
must be queried whether these reforms are treating the symptoms, or the disease, and if the latter, what is the 
disease?  
 
It has been said that there is nothing inherently “wrong” with the complex financial instruments that were central 
to the crash of confidence in debt markets that precipitated the financial crisis. It is the people who use them and 
manage the relevant debt. It would seem that enough people have used them inappropriately that it was possible 
to provide a part of the cause of the second worst financial crisis of living memory. If the ethics guidelines were 
not followed then, who is to say that changes to guidelines and ethics will prevent the bad behaviour in the future.  
It is necessary therefore to find a way to better “enforce” the guidelines, or essentially, in the style of Coase, to 
make the “price” of breaking the rules too high for bankers or other financiers to be willing to pay. Compare it for 
example to the arguments about gun laws in the United States. The gun lobbyists and the NRA say it is not the 
guns; it is the people who use them. With that logic it would seem that given the increase in senseless gun crime 
in the US over the last several decades, it is clear that the people cannot be controlled with the rules that are in 
place now. Perhaps then something should be done about access to the guns themselves. They are fine and useful 
tools if used properly by well trained, sane and appropriate people – but that means making sure that we put our 
guns – and our money – in those right hands. 
 
While the reasons for the crisis cannot be laid solely at the feet of the banking industry, the way that debt is 
handled is at least one small aspect that can be reconsidered, perhaps leading to improved institutions for handling 
debt that could prevent its level of contribution to future problems in the global economy. The complex, 
interconnected, and dependent structure of financial institutions require an international approach to financial 
distress amongst financial institutions. Although UNCITRAL provides model laws and promotes the noble goal 
of coordination among the courts of the world that hear insolvency cases, it has been viewed as being inadequate 
to the nature of financial institutions as they tend to fail to address the structural dependency inherent in them.31 
A paradigm shift in the way that debt is perceived could lead to a better handling of future economic risks, 
potentially avoiding a financial crisis having the catastrophic impact of the last one. A more transparent system 
of banking may also lend itself to a better coordination on the international stage as well. Given the 
interconnectedness of our economies, better cooperation could only improve the resolution of debt. 
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